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Abstract
In the context of medical advice to patients, the UK decision in Montgomery v.
Lanarkshire Health Board rejected the application of Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management
Committee. This article argues that the rejection is neither complete nor settled. We
explore doctrinal, conceptual and practical limitations of Montgomery to demonstrate
the vestiges of Bolam’s relevance to medical advice. Medical advice does not end with
disclosure of material risk but incorporates information on prognosis, diagnosis and
treatment alternatives. Montgomery does not always apply in these cases, nor outside
the medical mainstream or where patients lack capacity to consent. We identify ways
in which the extension of patient-centred care in the giving of medical advice can be
achieved through incremental development of Montgomery and application of the
Bolitho gloss to require that processes conform to Montgomery principles of partner-
ship and autonomy.
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Introduction
For some time, the non-disclosure of information to patients in England and Wales was
governed by Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee (Bolam), a highly influ-
ential first instance decision which set out the standard of care for skilled professionals
applied in relation to both treatment/diagnosis and the giving of advice about risks
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inherent in medical treatment.1 In 2015, the UK Supreme Court in Montgomery v.
Lanarkshire Health Board (Montgomery) held that Bolam should no longer apply in the
context of negligent non-disclosure of information about risks and reasonable treatment
alternatives.2 Lords Kerr and Reed, who jointly gave the leading judgment, stated:
‘There is no reason to perpetuate the application of the Bolam test in this context any
longer’.3 In this article, we expose Bolam’s ongoing legacy in relation to aspects of
healthcare professionals’ (HCPs’) advisory role. We suggest ways in which legal devel-
opments might mitigate issues flowing from the dual application of Bolam and Mon-
tgomery in different aspects of HCPs’ advisory role and endorse a patient-centred
approach to medical advice that applies beyond negligent non-disclosure of information.
In ‘The Bolam identity’4 and ‘The Bolam betrayal’, we briefly set out the Bolam
decision, its expansion and subsequent attempts to apply judicial controls, particularly in
relation to non-disclosure of information in the case of Montgomery. The next sections
set out new arguments as to Bolam’s legacy from two perspectives. We begin with a
doctrinal examination of Bolam’s current relevance. While Montgomery enhances com-
mitment to patient values, it also (rightly we would argue) recognises the pertinence of
clinical expertise, and with it, the relevance of Bolam. In ‘The Bolam retribution’, we
argue that the dissection of the duty of care established in Montgomery is neither settled
nor clear. We derive three explanations from Montgomery for the respective relevance of
Bolam and Montgomery tests and show that they can conflict. The next section considers
Bolam’s legacy beyond negligence. In ‘The Montgomery enigma’, we criticise the con-
sumeristic conception of patient choice alluded to in Montgomery. We consider the
inherent limitations of Montgomery given its focus on material risk which relates to but
one of many aspects of the HCP advisory role, and set out practical challenges in its
application. We set out a normative argument for the development of a better apprecia-
tion of the role of partnership in both treatment selection and choice between treatments.
In the final section – the ‘Montgomery supremacy’ – we consider the potential for
Montgomery’s incremental legal development and influence.
Montgomery is a landmark decision and adoption of its principles within and beyond
clinical negligence has potential to transform clinical practice. However, while Bolam’s
influence has declined, we point to its continued relevance in various aspects of clinical
advice, and while Montgomery represents a watershed, there are barriers to the prolif-
eration of its principles beyond clinical negligence. In working to overcome these chal-
lenges, we emphasise the importance of balancing patient values with professional
expertise and set out ways in which that might be achieved.
1. Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 583. And see Scottish case
Hunter v. Hanley [1955] SLT 312.
2. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [2014] 2 All ER 1031, [86]–[87]
(per Lords Kerr and Reed unless otherwise stated). See M. Brazier and E. Cave, Medicine,
Patients and the Law (Manchester: MUP, 2016), 5.8.
3. Montgomery, op. cit., [86].
4. The headings used in this article mirror the Bourne series by bestselling author Robert
Ludlum, and subsequently Eric van Lustbader.
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The Bolam identity
Mr Bolam agreed to undergo electroconvulsive therapy to treat his mental illness but
sued in negligence when he suffered injury. He complained that he should have been
given relaxants and restrained to reduce the risk of physical injury, and also that he
should have been warned of the risks. McNair J set out the test for assessing the standard
of care in negligence cases involving skilled professionals:
[H]e is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as
proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in this particular art.5
The result is that, where skilled professionals reach the standard of a responsible body
of opinion, they will not be found negligent merely because other skilled professionals
would have acted differently. Applying the test in Bolam, expert evidence established
that medical opinion was opposed to both relaxants and restraints. Furthermore, it was
accepted practice not to warn of small risks unless the patient specifically asked. The jury
(as the case was then decided) did not establish negligence in relation to either the
treatment or the non-disclosure of information as to risk.
In relation to non-disclosure of risk, the relevance of the Bolam test was reconsidered
in Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital (Sidaway).6 Should errors
regarding disclosure of information be viewed in the same way as errors in the operating
theatre? The judgments in Sidaway varied in approach,7 with Lord Diplock siding firmly
with application of the Bolam test, Lord Scarman embracing a more patient-centred
approach and Lord Bridge of Harwich (with whom Lord Keith agreed) and Lord Temple-
man somewhere between. Lord Diplock was concerned that the law relating to negligently
caused injury should not be carved up across different aspects of patient care:
This general duty [of care owed by a doctor] is not subject to dissection into a number of
component parts to which different criteria of what satisfy the duty of care apply, such as
diagnosis, treatment and advice . . . [S]uch dissection . . . is neither legally meaningful nor
medically practicable.8
The majority judgments have been interpreted9 to require that a patient was entitled to
receive only the amount of information that a responsible body of medical opinion
5. Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 583, 121 (McNair J).
Subsequently approved in Whitehouse v. Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246, Maynard v. West
Midlands RHA [1984] 1 WLR 634.
6. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871. See M. Brazier,
‘Patient Autonomy and Consent to Treatment: The Role of the Law’, Legal Studies 7 (1987),
p. 168; M. Jones, ‘Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories’, Medical Law Review 7(2)
(1999), p. 103.
7. See Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [57].
8. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871, 893.
9. At least initially, Lords Kerr and Reed present a more analogical account in Montgomery v.
Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11. See criticism in C. Hobson, ‘No (,) More Bolam
Please: Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board’, Modern Law Review 79(3) (2016), p. 488.
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considered relevant. The implication was that disclosure of information (or, as Lord
Diplock termed, ‘advice’) was considered an aspect of treatment and diagnosis, and thus
a matter of clinical judgment. We will see in the next section that this did not prove
workable because it did not allow the law to protect patients from medical paternalism.
Nonetheless, we will later argue that Lord Diplock’s warning about the practical diffi-
culties in dissecting the duty of care was prescient.
In relation to both treatment/diagnosis and information disclosure, Bolam enhanced
certainty by giving HCPs confidence that differing perspectives would not necessarily be
viewed in law as evidence of substandard care. From a patient perspective, however,
Bolam made it difficult to establish breach and set a tone of deference to the medical
profession that applied in both court and practice. In cases where different and discordant
expert medical opinions existed, the HCP merely had to conform to one of them.10
Bolam also offered a judicial solution to wider matters of medical ethics and complex
clinical questions. Swoboda has described ‘The deep ossification of the Bolam test in the
common law’.11 Brazier and Miola refer to a process of ‘Bolamisation’12 whereby the
courts abrogated responsibility for ethical issues and lacunae in the law into the hands of
doctors. What ought to be done became, by default, what reasonable doctors would
ordinarily do.13 In particular, Bolam dominated the test by which a patient’s best inter-
ests was determined. This was particularly apparent in cases on sterilisation of patients
lacking capacity14 and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.15 Brazier and Miola
also present evidence of a subtler infiltration in Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area
Health Authority,16 which set out the test for child competence, and subsequent cases
concerning treatment refusal, where they argue that covert application of Bolam effec-
tively determined the reasonableness of treatment in the child’s best interests.17
The extension of Bolam was influenced by the sociocultural context. Decided in 1957,
the National Health Service was in its infancy. Social factors such as class differences
between most doctors and their patients and costly NHS reforms that limited the
10. Maynard v. West Midlands RHA [1984] 1 WLR 634.
11. J.-P. Swoboda, ‘Bolam: Going, Going, Gone’, Journal of Personal Injury Law 9(1) (2018), p.
14.
12. M. Brazier and J. Miola, ‘Bye Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation Revolution?’, Medical Law
Review 8(1) (2000), p. 85; and see M. Brazier and J. Montgomery, ‘Whence and Whither
“Modern Medical Law”?’, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 70(1) (2019), p. 5, at 20.
13. See M. Davies, ‘The “New Bolam”: Another False Dawn for Medical Negligence?’,
Professional Negligence 12 (1996), p. 10: ‘[w]hen in doubt “Bolamise”’.
14. Re F (Mental patient sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. See Brazier and Miola, ‘Bye Bye Bolam’,
p. 92.
15. Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 (HL); Re G [1995] 2 FLR 528. Brazier and
Miola, op. cit., pp. 92–93.
16. [1985] 3 All ER 402 (HL). C/f J. Montgomery ‘Children as Property?’ The Modern Law
Review 51 (1988), p. 323.
17. Re R (A Minor) (Wardship Medical Treatment) [1991] 4 All ER 177 (CA); Re W (A Minor)
(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627 (CA). Brazier and Miola, ‘Bye Bye
Bolam’, p. 94.
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potential for patient choice provided the backdrop to the decision.18 Evidence of clinical
efficacy was sparse or anecdotal in contrast to the era of evidence-based medicine in
which we now reside. Doctors set themselves apart in their expertise, and the courts
relied on them in complex and uncertain clinical and ethical cases.19 Medical regulation
was scant and there was little by way of detailed guidance from regulatory bodies. These
factors resulted in greater reliance on clinical judgment and information disclosure was
dominated by the principle of doing no harm.20
The Bolam betrayal
The context has since changed dramatically. The National Institute for Clinical Excellence
(now the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)) was established in 1999
and evidence-based medicine has become the norm.21 Guidance from Royal Colleges and
regulatory bodies is increasingly detailed and prolific. Where interaction was once domi-
nated by a doctor–patient relationship, decisions are increasingly made between the patient
and a team of HCPs.22 Change was also driven by developments in human rights,23 an
information revolution and the rise of consumerism.24 The social and legal changes have
been heralded as moving from patient as ‘passive recipient’ to patient as active participant25:
from doctor- to patient-centred practice.
Devaney and Holm argue that paternalism and deference once went hand in hand, but
legal and policy initiatives26 emphasising patient choice, have been successful in limit-
ing paternalism.27 These sociocultural transformations impacted on Bolam’s dominance
across different applications. We will focus on the changes with regard to disclosure of
18. R. Schwartz and A. Grubb, ‘Why Britain Can’t Afford Patient Choice’, Hastings Center
Report 15(4) (1985), p. 19, at 22.
19. S. Devaney and S. Holm, ‘The Transmutation of Deference in Medicine: A Medico-Legal
Perspective’, Medical Law Review 26(2) (2018), p. 202, at 206.
20. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [74].
21. T. Hope, Evidence-Based Patient Choice (London: The King’s Fund, 1997).
22. See Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [75]–[76] and S. Holm,
‘Final Responsibility for Treatment Choice: The Proper Role of Medical Doctors?’, Health
Expectations 14(2) (2011), p. 201.
23. See T.T. Arvind and A. McMahon, ‘Responsiveness and the Role of Rights in Medical Law:
Lessons From Montgomery’, Medical Law Review (2020), forthcoming. Available at: https://
doi-org.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/10.1093/medlaw/fwaa006.
24. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [75]–[81]. The focus on
consumerism is discussed critically below.
25. Op. cit., [75].
26. For example: DHSC, Choosing Health: Making Choices Easier (London, 2004); DHSC,
Choice Matters: Putting Patients in Control (London, 2007); DHSC, Operational Guidance
to the NHS: Extending Patient Choice of Provider (London, 2011); DHSC, Liberating the
NHS: No Decision About Me, Without Me (London, 2012); NHS, Five Year Forward View
(London, 2014).
27. Devaney and Holm, ‘The Transmutation of Deference’. And see O. Quick, Regulating
Patient Safety: The End of Professional Dominance (Cambridge: CUP, 2017), p. 24.
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information and advice, but it is worth briefly noting constraints on the Bolam test in
relation to treatment and diagnosis cases and beyond.
Bolam continues to apply to medical treatment and diagnosis cases,28 but the House of
Lords made efforts to correct what they saw as a misinterpretation of Bolam in Bolitho v.
City and Hackney Health Authority.29 This 1997 decision enhanced the potential for
judges to question the logic of medical judgments. Lord Browne-Wilkinson added a
gloss to the Bolam test, recognising that ‘if, in a rare case, it can be demonstrated that the
professional opinion is not capable of withstanding logical analysis, the judge is entitled
to hold that the body of opinion is not reasonable or responsible’.30 The Bolitho judgment
reasserted boundaries: judges must scrutinise the foundation of medical opinion and
must be satisfied that it rests on logical foundations, but it only goes so far. The Bolitho
gloss will only apply where ‘a judge can be satisfied that the body of expert opinion
cannot be logically supported at all’.31
While Bolam applies in cases of misdiagnosis that result in harmful treatment,32 it
has less relevance to pure misdiagnosis cases, where a diagnosis is either right or
wrong and does not result in the balancing of risks and benefits in order to determine
whether to treat. In Muller v. King’s College Hospital NHS FT,33 Mr Muller was
misdiagnosed by a histopathologist. He was told a malignant melanoma was in fact
an ulcer which delayed effective treatment. One expert argued that a reasonable com-
petent histopathologist could have made such an error. On a straightforward applica-
tion of Bolam, there would be no finding of negligence. However, Kerr J was
unconvinced of Bolam’s fit:
In a case involving advice, treatment or both, opposed expert opinions may in a sense both
be “right”, in that each represents a respectable body of professional opinion. The same is
not true of a pure diagnosis case such as the present, where there is no weighing of risks and
benefits, only misreporting which may or may not be negligent.34
28. See, for example, Dyson v. Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust [2017] EWHC 1910
(QB).
29. Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232.
30. Op. cit., 243 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
31. Op. cit.
32. Maynard v. West Midlands RHA [1984] 1 WLR 634. And see discussion of Taylor v. Dailly
Health Centre [2018] CSOH 91, below.
33. Muller v. King’s College Hospital NHS FT [2017] EWHC 12 (QB). See also Lillywhite v.
UCL Hospitals NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 1466 and XXX v. King’s College Hospital NHS
FT [2018] EWHC 646 QB, discussed in S. Fox QC, Bolam is Dead, Long Live Bolam! (2
October 2018). Exchange Chambers blog post. Available at: https://www.
exchangechambers.co.uk/bolam-is-dead-long-live-bolam-simon-fox-qc/ (accessed 30
March 2020).
34. Muller, op. cit., [75]. And see Penney v. East Kent HA [2000] PNLR 323, 334 (HHJ Peppitt
QC).
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Bound by the law, Kerr J found that negligence was established, not by dis-applying
Bolam to purely diagnostic errors but by applying the Bolitho gloss.35 Poole has argued
that this point is likely to be developed should a case on pure misdiagnosis or misreport-
ing reach the higher courts.36
The Bolamisation process referred to by Brazier and Miola has also been restricted. In
the context of mental capacity, best interests had been equated with acting in accordance
with an accepted body of medical opinion in Re F,37 but this notion was criticised in Re
S.38 There, Butler-Sloss P acknowledged that the starting point in a medical decision is
Bolam, but there may be more than one Bolam-compliant option and the court’s role is to
determine the best option.39 Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 now takes a
patient-centred approach, evaluating the ‘best’ option in light of the patient’s values.40
What of non-disclosure of information? In Bolitho, Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s obser-
vations focused on treatment and diagnosis cases.41 Two separate qualifications in
relation to information disclosure were set out in Sidaway. They were, however, of
limited value to patients. First, the judgment distinguished cases where questions were
raised directly by the patient, in which case a duty would arise.42 This was problematic,
not least because the patient may lack the clinical expertise to know to raise the ques-
tion.43 A second qualification related to disclosures that are ‘so obviously necessary to an
informed choice on the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent medical man would
fail to make it’, for example ‘if there was a substantial risk of grave adverse conse-
quences, as, for example, the ten per cent risk of a stroke’.44 This qualification was
described by Lords Kerr and Reed in Montgomery as ‘inherently instable’: the applica-
tion of the Bolam test to information disclosure emphasised the relevance of clinical
judgment which sat uneasily with the recognition that patients are entitled to make an
informed choice.45 The Supreme Court recognised that, as a result, the qualification has
been restrictively applied.46
35. [1997] 3 WLR 1151; [1998] AC 232. See also Brady v. Southend University Hospital NHS
FT [2020] EWHC 158 (QB), 23 (Andrew Lewis QC).
36. N. Poole QC, ‘Learned Friend: Bolam Under the Microscope’ (6 February 2017). Available
at: https://nigelpooleqc.blogspot.com/2017/02/bolam-under-microscope.html (accessed 30
March 2020).
37. Re F (Mental patient sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1.
38. Re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) [2001] Fam 15.
39. See Aintree University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v. James [2013] UKSC 67, [24]
(Lady Hale).
40. Op. cit.: ‘The advantage of a best interests test was that it focused upon the patient as an
individual, rather than the conduct of the doctor’.
41. Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232, 243 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
42. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871, 902–903
(Lord Templeman).
43. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [58]–[59].
44. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871, 900 (Lord
Bridge).
45. See Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [61].
46. Op. cit.
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In Sidaway, information disclosure was judged by the majority to constitute an inte-
gral part of medical treatment. Lord Scarman, dissenting, stated: ‘The profession, it is
said, should not be judge in its own cause’.47 He pointed out the existence of ‘the
patient’s right to make his own decision’ or ‘self-determination’,48 which is protected
by the common law and ought not depend merely on medical considerations. Lord
Scarman supported a test for materiality that put the patient centre-stage. HCPs would
be required to disclose risks to which a reasonable patient would attach significance.49
As we have seen, Lord Diplock’s position was that doctors are better equipped to
determine reasonableness than the courts, but the single test proved problematic in
relation to information disclosure, because judgment as to its adequacy is less dependent
on medical expertise.50
So began a disaggregation of treatment/diagnosis and information non-disclosure.51
The courts effected an evolution which others have charted in detail52 and we summarise
only briefly. In Pearce, Lord Woolf proposed a variation on the standard of disclosure set
out in Sidaway: ‘if there is significant risk which would affect the judgment of a rea-
sonable patient, then in the normal course it is the responsibility of a doctor to inform the
patient of that significant risk’.53 Subsequently, in Chester v. Afshar54 – a case on
causation rather than breach – Lord Steyn asserted that: ‘[The patient’s] right of auton-
omy and dignity can and ought to be vindicated by a narrow and modest departure from
traditional causation principles’.55
The steps towards a patient-centred approach to information disclosure culminated in
the Supreme Court decision of Montgomery v. Lanarkshire HB, which rejected the test
set out in Bolam and perpetuated in Sidaway (though we will argue that the extent of that
47. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871, 882.
48. Op. cit.
49. Op. cit.: ‘The courts should not allow medical opinion as to what is best for the patient to
override the patient’s right to decide for himself whether he will submit to the treatment
offered him’.
50. I. Kennedy, ‘The Patient on the Clapham Omnibus’, The Modern Law Review 47 (1984), p.
454.
51. In the UK and internationally: And in USA: Canterbury v. Spence (464 F2d 772, 782 DC Cir
1972); Canada: Reibl v. Hughes [1980] 2 SCR 880; Australia: Rogers v. Whitaker (1992) 175
CLR 479; Malaysia: Foo Fio Na v. Dr Soo Fook Mun (2007) 1 Malayan Law Journal 593;
Singapore: Hii Chii Kok v. (1) Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien; (2) National Cancer Centre
[2017] SGCA 38, (Hii).
52. A. MacLean, ‘The Doctrine of Informed Consent: Does It Exist and Has It Crossed the
Atlantic?’ Legal Studies 24 (2004), p. 386; A.-M. Farrell and M. Brazier, ‘Not so New
Directions in the Law of Consent? Examining Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board’,
Journal of Medical Ethics 42(2) (2015), p. 85.
53. Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] PIQR 53, 21. And see Marriott v.
West Midlands HA [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep Med 23; Wyatt v. Curtis [2003] EWCA Civ 1779;
Birch v. University College London Hospital NHS FT [2008] EWHC 2237 (QB).
54. Chester v. Afshar [2004] UKHL 41.
55. Op. cit., [24] and see [18]. See G. Turton, ‘Informed Consent to Medical Treatment Post-
Montgomery: Causation and Coincidence’, Medical Law Reports 27(1) (2019), p. 108.
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rejection is unclear) in favour of a patient-centred test.56 The decision recognised the
right of persons to determine what shall be done with their bodies. Montgomery effected
the dissection of negligence that Lord Diplock (above) warned against: the tests in
relation to treatment/diagnosis and information disclosure were segregated. Bolam
remains pertinent where different ‘schools of thought in medical science’ may apply,
but Lords Kerr and Reed found that its application in relation to discussions of risk could
lead to acceptance of ‘divergent attitudes among doctors as to the degree of respect owed
to their patients’.57 The new test of materiality in information disclosure set out in
Montgomery is whether:
a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the
risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely
to attach significance to it.58
Communication of risk, benefit and reasonable alternatives is now judged according
to what the reasonable and sometimes the actual patient wants to know.59 Montgomery
adopts a mixture of subjective and objective assessments. In determining materiality, the
Supreme Court emphasised that it cannot be defined as a matter of statistical analysis but
is specific to the facts and the characteristics of the patient.60 The Supreme Court Justices
did not make clear precisely how to determine the subjective element, but Lords Kerr and
Reed did provide guidance as to the dialogue necessary to establish relevant patient
characteristics.61
Practical guidance to doctors enhances the patient-centred approach taken in Mon-
tgomery. Pre-Montgomery guidance from the General Medical Council (GMC) on con-
sent requires that patients ‘must’ be given the information ‘they want or need’ in relation
to a range of issues62 and that doctors ‘should’ ‘explore these matters with patients, listen
to their concerns, ask for and respect their views, and encourage them to ask questions’.
Post-Montgomery, new draft GMC guidance replaces ‘should’ with ‘must’.63 In addition,
56. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11. For details of the facts, ratio
decidendi and subsequent development, see S. Devaney, C. Purshouse, et al., ‘The Far-
Reaching Implications of Montgomery for Risk Disclosure in Practice’, Journal of Patient
Safety and Risk Management 24(1) (2018), p. 25.
57. Montgomery, op. cit., [84].
58. Op. cit., [87]–[88]. In A v. East Kent Hospitals NHS FT [2015] EWHC 1038 ‘theoretical,
negligible or background’ risks did not need to be disclosed.
59. Montgomery, op. cit., [55], [87].
60. Op. cit., [89].
61. Op. cit., [90]; and see Thefaut v. Johnson [2017] EWHC 497 (QB), [58]–[59] (Green J).
62. GMC, Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together (2008), para. 9. Available
at: https://www.gmc-uk.org/static/documents/content/Consent_-_English_0617.pdf
(accessed 30 March 2020). The GMC appeared as interveners in the Montgomery case.
63. GMC, Draft Guidance for Consultation: Decision Making and Consent: Supporting Patient
Choices About Health and Care (2018), para. 11. Available at: https://www.gmc-uk.org/
about/get-involved/consultations/review-of-our-consent-guidance (accessed 30 March
2020).
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it requires doctors to tailor information to patient needs, wishes, values and priorities as
well as their level of understanding and the nature of the proposed options.64 While
Montgomery endorsed a view already adopted by the GMC, the Council’s draft revised
guidance is testament to the practical importance of the legal development and the need
to operationalise the Montgomery principles beyond the law of negligence.
The Bolam retribution
One of the themes that has been taken forward in case law post-Montgomery is that ‘the
Bolam approach is no longer appropriate in cases of informed consent’.65 However, this
section specifies ways in which the Bolam legacy endures. We acknowledge the need to
dissect the law of negligence in Montgomery, so as to recognise different duties with
respect to treatment/diagnosis and information disclosure. A failure to do so would have
perpetuated medical dominance and paternalism. However, we also recognise the force
in Lord Diplock’s warning in Sidaway that the dissection would lead to problems of
impracticability. We argue that there is a lack of clarity as to the dissection in Mon-
tgomery and its subsequent common law development that muddies the boundaries of
Bolam’s continued relevance.
The effect of Montgomery was to overrule Sidaway and disapply Bolam with respect
to information non-disclosure. Lady Hale concluded that ‘once the argument departs
from purely medical considerations and involves value judgments of this sort’, Bolam
‘becomes quite inapposite’.66 This section identifies areas in which there is debate as to
whether value judgments based on the needs and preferences of the patient are relevant
to aspects of information non-disclosure. Where medical expertise is relevant and value
judgments of the sort envisaged in Montgomery are not pertinent to the issue, there is an
argument that Bolam remains relevant. Montgomery leaves open the possibility that the
new test for materiality might apply to the reasonableness of knowledge of risk, selection
of treatment alternatives, the operation of the therapeutic exception and potentially
disclosure of differential diagnosis. But an alternative and dominant view reasserts the
relevance of the Bolam test alongside the Montgomery test, drawing on Lords Kerr and
Reed’s
fundamental distinction between, on the one hand, the doctor’s role when considering
possible investigatory or treatment options and, on the other, her role in discussing with
the patient any recommended treatment and possible alternatives, and the risks of injury
which may be involved.67
First, there was initial uncertainty as to Montgomery’s effect on the relevance of the
Bolam test in cases concerning non-disclosure of information. In Spencer v. Hillingdon,
64. Op. cit., para. 13.
65. Ollosson v. Lee [2019] EWHC 784 (QB), [11] (Stewart J), paraphrasing Webster v. Burton
Hospitals NHS FT [2017] EWCA Civ 62, [26]–[31] (Simon LJ).
66. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [115].
67. Op. cit., [82].
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HHJ Collender QC applied the Bolam test in the context of advice on post-operative risk,
subject to a Montgomery ‘gloss’. The test applied was: ‘would the ordinary sensible
patient be justifiably aggrieved not to have been given the information at the heart of this
case when fully appraised of the significance of it?’.68 This interpretation was later
rejected in Thefaut v. Johnson, where Green J did not accept that the Montgomery test
is a variant of Bolam.69
Second, Bolam has potential application in relation to the therapeutic exception,
which in exceptional circumstances HCPs might employ if they consider disclosure of
material information to be detrimental to the health of the patient.70 Because of the
relevance of medical expertise to its application, Bolam is likely to apply.71 Montgom-
ery was influential in the recent Singapore Court of Appeal in Hii Chii Kok v. Ooi Peng
Jin London Lucien (Hii).72 In that case, Bolam was held to be relevant to the consid-
eration of reasonable justifications for withholding information, such as waiver, emer-
gency treatment and the therapeutic exception. We comment no further in light of
arguments previously articulated by one of us that the therapeutic exception is of
dubious relevance and seems unlikely to be developed or relied upon in legal
proceedings.73
Third, the question arises as to the test to be applied in relation to the risks associated
with treatment. HCPs cannot inform patients of risks they know nothing about, but in
some cases, they might be found to have constructive knowledge of risk: if information
on risk is material, but the HCP did not know of it, then the question is raised as to the
reasonableness of the HCP’s position. Ought this matter to be governed by Bolam?
Austin notes that the Singapore Court of Appeal in Hii applied Bolam on the basis that
the lack of information would lead to a wrongful diagnosis or negligent treatment.74
Austin is critical of this conclusion on the basis that the crux of the action is advice on
risk. The matter came before the Court of Appeal in Duce v. Worcester Acute Hospitals
NHS Trust where a patient underwent surgery to relieve pre-existing pain and was not
warned that the operation could result in serious and permanent pain. Montgomery was
framed as a two-part test:
68. Spencer v. Hillingdon Hospital NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 1058, [68].
69. Thefaut v. Johnston [2017] EWHC 497 (QB), [62].
70. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [85], [91].
71. Hobson, ‘No (,) more Bolam please’; R. Mulheron, ‘Has Montgomery Administered the Last
Rites to Therapeutic Privilege? A Diagnosis and a Prognosis’, Current Legal Problems 70(1)
(2017), p. 149.
72. Hii Chii Kok v. (1) Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien; (2) National Cancer Centre [2017] SGCA
38. See LV Austin, ‘Hii Chii Kok v (1) Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien; (2) National Cancer
Centre: Modifying Montgomery’, Medical Law Review 27(2) (2019), p. 339.
73. E. Cave, ‘The Ill-Informed: Consent to Medical Treatment and the Therapeutic Exception’,
Common Law World Review 46(2), (2017) p. 140. Note that it was not applicable in Gallardo
v. Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust [2017] EWHC 3147 (QB) discussed below.
74. Hii Chii Kok v. (1) Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien; (2) National Cancer Centre [2017] SGCA
38, [133], [147]; Austin, ‘Hii Chii Kok’.
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(1) What risks associated with an operation were or should have been known to the medical
professional in question. That is a matter falling within the expertise of medical profes-
sionals [83].
(2) Whether the patient should have been told about such risks by reference to whether they
were material. That is a matter for the Court to determine [83]. This issue is not therefore the
subject of the Bolam test and not something that can be determined by reference to expert
evidence alone [84]–[85].75
The two parts are distinguished on the basis of the relevance of expertise to the
judgment of reasonableness: Bolam governs the matter of whether the risks were or
should have been known; if so, Montgomery governs the question of whether the patient
should have been informed. In Duce, the second part of the test (materiality) was
irrelevant in light of the fact that the first part was not satisfied: the risks were not
considered by medical experts to be known risks at the relevant time. From a patient’s
perspective, the dual operation of Bolam and Montgomery and reliance on expert opinion
in determining constructive knowledge of risk might seem to perpetuate the HCP-
centred standard set out in Bolam. They might argue that their values are potentially
relevant to the matter of what risks should have been known.
Fourth, a duty to warn of reasonable alternatives that carry fewer or no risks was
upheld in Birch v. University College London Hospital NHS Foundation Trust,76 and a
requirement to discuss ‘any reasonable alternative or variant treatments’ was recognised
in Montgomery.77 In Montgomery, the non-disclosure of risk relating to shoulder dysto-
cia was directly related to the requirement to inform the patient of alternative treatment
by caesarean.78 This may be the extent of the duty to discuss alternatives, in which case
Bolam remains pertinent to the reasonableness of clinicians’ decisions regarding treat-
ment selection, except where selection is necessitated by the communication of a mate-
rial risk. If a failure to consider an alternative does not breach Bolam, then it is less likely
to be considered a ‘reasonable’ alternative, even if it would not breach Bolam for a
clinician to offer that alternative. Poole warns that this has potential to undermine
Montgomery:
75. [2018] EWCA Civ 1307, [33] (paragraphs in bracket refer to Montgomery): see discussion in
N. Poole QC, Learned Friend Blog: ‘After Montgomery: Part One: Bolam Returns’ (11
September 2018). Available at: https://nigelpooleqc.blogspot.com/2018/09/after-
montgomery-part-one-bolam-returns.html (accessed 30 March 2020). Applied in Kennedy
v. Frankel [2019] EWHC 106 (QB), [12] (Yip J).
76. Birch v. University College London Hospital NHS FT [2008] EWHC 2237 (QB), on which
see Rob Heywood, 2009. See also R (Burke) v. General Medical Council (Official Solicitor
and Others Intervening) [2005] EWCA 1003, [51].
77. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [87].
78. See M. Dunn, K.M.W. Fulford, J. Herring, et al., ‘Between the Reasonable and the Particular:
Deflating Autonomy in the Legal Regulation of Informed Consent to Medical Treatment’,
Health Care Analysis 27(2) (2019), p. 110.
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Suppose there is an innovative treatment being used by 10 per cent of clinicians in a
particular field, and that the patient’s clinician knows about it but considers it not to be a
reasonable alternative because it has not been sufficiently tried and tested. If the Bolam test
applies then the Court might well find that it was not negligent to have failed to have
mentioned the alternative to the patient. Is that not the very paternalism that the Supreme
Court in Montgomery was striving to end?79
An argument might be advanced that Montgomery has wider relevance to treatment
alternatives: if a reasonable patient would find the alternative significant or the clinician
is aware that the particular patient would find it so, then it ought to be put to the patient.80
On this basis, alternatives should sometimes be communicated to the patient, even if they
would pose greater clinical risk than the clinically optimal treatment, because it would be
for the patient to choose between them according to their values and preferences. Bolam
would still be relevant to the selection of treatment alternatives insofar as the clinician
should offer alternatives unless no reasonable doctor would do so. This would maximise
the patient’s opportunity to decide whether a clinically riskier treatment is in fact better
suited to their values and preferences.
However, there has been a marked judicial reluctance to adopt such an approach. We
focus in this section on the doctrinal development to demonstrate the continued rele-
vance of Bolam in aspects of the HCP’s advisory role. In the next section, we turn to the
rationale behind it. In Bayley v. George Eliot Hospital, the claimant argued that she
ought to have been advised of an alternative treatment that she would have been willing
to fund privately.81 HHJ Worster rejected this argument. The alternative was a possible
option, but in 2008 it was not an appropriate option.82 Elements of Bolam flow from the
judge’s focus on the reasonable competent surgeon in 2008.83
In Scotland in 2018, Lord Boyd issued an Opinion arising from the use of vaginal
mesh products in the treatment of the pursuers in which the definition of reasonable
treatment options was contested. Lord Boyd found that Montgomery’s application was
restricted to communication of the risks associated with treatment options.84 The Hunter
v. Hanley85 test (broadly the Scottish equivalent of Bolam) was relevant to decisions
about diagnosis and treatment. A different approach was taken in Hii (Singapore) where
the court articulated certain alternatives HCPs are not bound to disclose including
‘fringe’ treatments, alternative medicine, or ‘mainstream treatment options which are
79. Poole, ‘After Montgomery’. See also N. Poole QC, Clinical Negligence Made Clear (Bath:
Bath Publishing, 2019), p. 118.
80. See, for example, L. Sutherland QC, ‘Montgomery: Myths, Misconceptions and
Misunderstanding’, Journal of Personal Injury Law 3 (2019), p. 157.
81. [2017] EWHC 3398.
82. Op. cit., [99].
83. Poole, ‘After Montgomery’. And see Kennedy v. Frankel [2019] EWHC 106 (QB), [12]–[13]
(Yip J).
84. Opinion of Lord Boyd of Duncansby in the cause AH v. Greater Glasgow Health Board
[2018] CSOH 57, [38]–[45].
85. [1955] SLT 213, [1955] ScotCS CSIH.
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obviously inappropriate on the facts’,86 the assessment of which comes under Bolam.87
In England and Wales, it seems that a narrow approach to Montgomery’s application
to reasonable alternatives is emerging, particularly where treatment is urgently required.
A failure to identify an alternative is most likely to amount to breach of the duty if it is
relevant to the risk of proposed treatment.88 However, a wider approach may yet be
consolidated in relation to elective procedures where, for example, dialogue around more
conservative alternatives may be key,89 or in novel procedures, where dialogue around
standard options is important.90
A related issue arises around the duty to inform patients of alternative treatments
where diagnosis is uncertain (‘differential diagnosis’). 2008 GMC guidance requires
that patients are given information about diagnosis and prognosis and uncertainties
thereof.91 Pre-Montgomery, in Meiklejohn v. St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust, it
was said that the duty to warn of alternative diagnoses comes under Bolam and
Sidaway.92 Post-Montgomery it might be argued that dialogue around differential
diagnosis is required where it affects the range of alternatives and their relative risks
and benefits. However, in light of Duce and the restrictive approach taken to date
around treatment alternatives, if the differential diagnosis does not breach the duty
of care according to Bolam, Montgomery’s relevance as to its communication to the
patient seems likely to be limited.
In the Scottish case of Taylor v. Dailly Health Centre,93 32-year-old Mrs Taylor
suffered chest pain and subsequently died after a General Practitioner (GP) misdiag-
nosed her with gastro-intestinal upset and musculoskeletal pain. One of the claims was
that the GP had not obtained her informed consent because she was not advised of the
risk of alternative diagnosis – acute coronary syndrome – and accompanying treatment
options. Finding that Montgomery was irrelevant, Lord Tyre said:
A distinction fell to be drawn between (i) the doctor’s role when considering possible
investigatory or treatment options, and (ii) the doctor’s role in discussing with the patient
any recommended treatment and possible alternatives. The first remained an exercise of
86. Hii Chii Kok v. (1) Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien; (2) National Cancer Centre [2017] SGCA
38, [142].
87. Austin, ‘Hii Chii Kok’, 9.
88. For example, Tasmin v. Barts Health NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 3135 (QB) where ‘A risk of
1:1,000 is an immaterial risk for the purposes of paragraph 87 of Montgomery’ [118] (Jay J).
Therefore, there was no requirement to inform the patient of a particular alternative.
89. Thefaut v. Johnston [2017] EWHC 497 (QB); Hassell v. Hillingdon [2018] EWHC 164 (QB)
c/f Morocz v. Marshman [2015] NSWSC 325 (New South Wales: argument that patient
should have been warned not to undertake the cosmetic procedure she had extensively
researched was rejected).
90. Mills v. Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2019] EWHC 936 (QB).
91. GMC, Consent, para. 9 and see paras 2, 18, 37.
92. [2014] EWCA Civ 120, [62] (Rafferty LJ).
93. Taylor v. Dailly Health Centre [2018] CSOH 91.
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professional judgment, and [in this case] no duty existed to discuss that judgment with the
patient or seek consent to treat the patient in accordance with it.94
In 2020, the Paterson Inquiry recommended strengthened procedures to ensure that
patients are properly informed of their diagnosis as well as their treatment options.95
Should a case in England and Wales arise, this might influence judges to extend the remit
of Montgomery to require communication of differential diagnosis, at least where it
raises the possibility of less risky treatment.
It is possible to discern three explanations in Montgomery for the respective relevance
of Bolam and Montgomery tests: The distinction between selection of treatment options
versus the discussion of those options with the patient focuses on the difference between
treatment/diagnosis and informed consent; the relevance of different schools of medical
thought versus different approaches to respect for patient choice focuses on the role of
medical expertise; and the relevance of the patient’s values to the decision focuses on the
protection of patient rights. The explanations are generally harmonious but may conflict.
For example, the division in Montgomery between the role of HCPs in selecting treat-
ment options, making diagnoses and understanding the risks, and their role in disclosing
material information to patients so as to allow them to make an autonomous choice is
problematic insofar as the GMC acknowledges that patient values can be relevant to
selection of treatment options.96 There may be cases where patient values render Bolam
‘inapposite’, notwithstanding the relevance of medical expert evidence to determine
reasonableness. Subtle differences in rationale may also have resulted in latitude in the
subsequent application of Montgomery, resulting in a degree of ‘Bolam creep’.
In conclusion of this section, we have argued that Lord Diplock’s warning about the
practicability of dissecting the law of negligence has some bearing. Whilst there is force
in the argument that his view flowed principally from conservatism and deference to the
medical profession,97 we would argue that it is also based on the practical difficulties in
some cases of distinguishing advice and treatment/diagnosis. Bolam’s ‘legacy’ flows
from the unclear division, which raises questions as to the extent to which Bolam remains
relevant to the assessment of reasonableness of aspects of medical advice. We have
argued that the resolution of this debate is far from settled.
The Montgomery enigma
We move now from the continuing doctrinal relevance of Bolam in cases of non-
disclosure of risk, reasonable alternatives and differential diagnosis, to its wider
94. Op. cit., [40].
95. DHSC, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Issues Raised by Paterson. 2020 HC 31,
pp. 218–219.
96. GMC, Consent, para. 9. GMC guidance is not law, but the guidance was favourably
considered in Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [69], [77],
[78], [93] (Lords Kerr and Reed), [107], [109] (Lady Hale).
97. J. Miola, Medical Ethics and Medical Law: A Symbiotic Relationship (Oxford: Hart, 2007),
p. 57.
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influence in relation to medical advice. Notwithstanding the metaphorical legal and
cultural nails in Bolam’s coffin, the paternalistic ethos perpetuated in Bolam has proved
difficult to curtail. In this section, we explore three reasons for this: that Montgomery
seemingly endorses a consumeristic conception of patient choice, that the paternalistic
ethos is deeply ingrained in practice, and that outside the confines of negligent non-
disclosure of material risk, the principles endorsed in Montgomery are not equally
relevant to all aspects of medicine.
The Montgomery decision was based on principles of self-determination,98 partner-
ship,99 support,100 choice,101 and a move away from paternalism102 but also on consu-
merism.103 Seeming acceptance of consumerism has potential to create unrealistic
expectations of patient choice and blur the divide between selection of clinically appro-
priate treatments and patient choice between them. In this section, we set out a normative
argument for a clearer balance of patient choice and HCP expertise. Recognition that
Bolam is relevant to the selection of reasonable treatment options is problematic if it
leads to patient values being ignored. Similarly, recognition of the importance of patient
choice is problematic if clinical expertise is ignored. Montgomery requires a revised
professional autonomy rather than its abandonment.104 There is a role for clinical exper-
tise in the selection of relevant treatment options and in support of patients when they
choose between them that is potentially disrupted by emphasis in Montgomery on con-
sumerism. Conceptual clarification is required to recognise and better define the extent
of professional autonomy.
The rise of consumerism is not new. The internal market was introduced in the NHS
and Community Care Act 1990, assigning the role of purchaser to District Health
Authorities and encouraging providers to reduce costs and enhance efficiency. Accord-
ing to the King’s Fund, these early reforms had limited impact as incentives were weak,
constraints strong and information insufficient.105 It resulted in culture change, however,
encouraging greater focus on patient needs.106 New Labour retained the purchaser pro-
vider split and brought in commissioning. Market reforms were gradually introduced,
98. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [80] (Lords Reed and Kerr),
[108] (Lady Hale).
99. Op. cit., [77]–[78].
100. Op. cit., [90] (Lords Reed and Kerr), [110], [116] (Lady Hale).
101. Op. cit., [75].
102. Op. cit., [81].
103. Op. cit., [75].
104. J. Laing, ‘Delivering Informed Consent Post-Montgomery: Implications for Medical
Practice and Professionalism’, Professional Negligence 33 (2017), p. 128; Devaney and
Holm, ‘The Transmutation of Deference’; A theory as to how patient choice and
professional autonomy might be balanced is set out in E. Cave, ‘Selecting Treatment
Options and Choosing Between them: Delineating Patient and Professional Autonomy in
Shared Decision-Making’, Health Care Analysis 28 (2020), p. 4.
105. N. Mays, A. Dixon and L. Jones, Understanding New Labour’s Market Reforms of the
English NHS (London: King’s Fund, 2011), p. 3.
106. Op. cit.
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starting with a new focus on patient choice to enhance the patient experience in the NHS
Plan107 and introducing greater flexibility for providers through Foundation Trust status
and Payment by Results. Market-based approaches were extended in the Health and
Social Care Act 2012,108 underpinned by an ‘information revolution’.109 Competition
resulted in a mix of private and state-run NHS organisations which, Sturgeon argues,
made the NHS more business-like and consumeristic.110 Sturgeon points out that the
‘necessity’ of consumption in the NHS makes for valuable commercial opportunities and
thus drives consumerism.111
The Supreme Court Justices reference choice 17 times in Montgomery. Lords Kerr
and Reed recognise that patients are ‘widely treated as consumers exercising choices’.112
Consumerism can have value in the pressure it brings to bear to reform practice,113 but
critics point to the unsuitability of a consumer model in healthcare on the basis that
patients need support rather than an individualised choice architecture.114 Consumerism
can also lead to unmet patient expectations: it denotes a wide range of choice that is in
practice limited. Choice is limited by resources, evidence of clinical need and beneficent
obligations including Section 1 of the Health and Social Care (Safety and Quality) Act
2015115 which requires the Secretary of State to ensure that services cause ‘no avoidable
harm’ to service users.116 The Care Quality Commission states ‘providers must not
provide unsafe or inappropriate care just because someone has consented to care or
treatment that would be unsafe’.117 Competition has been introduced, with varying
degrees of success, to allow some choice of provider, though there is still considerable
control by HCPs as to when to refer and to what specialism. In relation to choice of
107. NHS Plan (DH, 2000). And see Health Reform in England: Update and Next Steps (DH,
2005).
108. See King’s Fund, Is the NHS Being Privatised? (2017). Available at: https://www.
kingsfund.org.uk/publications/articles/big-election-questions-nhs-privatised (accessed 30
March 2020).
109. White Paper, Liberating the NHS: An Information Revolution (DH, 2010).
110. D. Sturgeon, ‘The Business of the NHS: The Rise and Rise of Consumer Culture and
Commodification in the Provision of Healthcare Services’, Critical Social Policy 34(3)
(2014), p. 405.
111. Op. cit.
112. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [75].
113. Op. cit., [75]. And see M.K. Sheppard, ‘Fallacy or Functionality: Law and Policy of Patient
Treatment Choice in the NHS’, Health Care Analysis 24(4) (2016), p. 279.
114. I. Greener, ‘Are the Assumptions Underlying Patient Choice Realistic? A Review of the
Evidence’, British Medical Bulletin 83(1) (2007), p. 249, at 256; R. Downie, ‘Patients and
Consumers’, The Journal of the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh 14 (2017), p.
261, at 264.
115. Amending Health and Social Care Act 2008, s. 20.
116. See D. Wilkinson and J. Savulescu, ‘Cost-equivalence and Pluralism in Publicly-Funded
Health-Care Systems’, Health Care Analysis 26(4) (2018), p. 287.
117. CQC, Regulation 11: Need for Consent. Available at: https://www.cqc.org.uk/guidance-
providers/regulations-enforcement/regulation-11-need-consent#full-regulation (accessed
30 March 2020).
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treatment, in 1985 Schwartz and Grubb claimed that Britain could not afford informed
consent because the system could not respect patients’ reasonably possible choices:
Ultimately, the existence of a national health system, prospectively funded by a central
planning authority and with limited and defined resources, makes the acceptance of such a
doctrine an impossibility.118
Primacy cannot be given to patient rights to decide which treatment suits them best in
the way that it can in a system where consumers more directly fund their treatment.119
Notwithstanding creeping privatisation of the NHS, treatment in the NHS remains
largely free at the point of delivery and Schwartz and Grubb’s argument remains rele-
vant. Patient choice cannot extend to the right to demand treatment, though there is
evidence of increasing pressure on clinicians to comply with patient demands even when
the options sought by patients are not clinically indicated.120 Rather, patient preferences
must often give way to medical criteria, including the allocation of resources. Though
Lords Kerr and Reed are clear that professional expertise remains central to the selection
of suitable treatment options, the emphasis on consumerism in Montgomery is unfortu-
nate. In dismantling HCP-centred medicine, care must be taken to distance anti-
paternalism from unmitigated patient choice. The HCP role in selecting treatment
options can be carried out in a patient-centred manner that takes into consideration
patient values, without compromising the professional duty to base medical treatment
decisions on clinical need, evidence of efficacy and available resources.121
We have described a conflict of principles set out in Montgomery. Emphasis is placed
on consumerism that has potential to cause opacity in relation to the selection of treat-
ment options and the choice between them and raise patient and HCP expectations that
patients can choose treatment options that HCPs do not consider clinically justifiable.
But the Supreme Court also acknowledged the importance of dialogue and partnership. It
is apparent that the rejection of Bolam in Montgomery does not denote a rejection of the
role of HCP support in the choice between options. Nor does acceptance of the role of
medical expertise in the selection of treatment options mean that consideration of patient
values is excluded from the exercise. Shared decision-making is relevant to both selec-
tion and choice between options.122
118. Schwartz and Grubb, ‘Why Britain’.
119. Op. cit., 25. See R (Burke) v. General Medical Council (Official Solicitor and Others
Intervening) [2005] EWCA 1003.
120. D. Epstein, ‘When Evidence Says No, But Doctors Say Yes’ (2017) ProPublica Blog.
Available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/when-evidence-says-no-but-doctors-say-
yes. See also Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority et al., The Responsible Use
of Treatment Add-Ons in Fertility Services: A Consensus Statement (2019). Available at:
https://www.hfea.gov.uk/media/2792/treatment-add-ons-consensus-statement-final.pdf
(accessed 30 March 2020).
121. See Cave, ‘Selecting Treatment Options and Choosing Between Them’.
122. This is so notwithstanding the tests to establish breach in negligence may differ. See Cave,
op. cit.
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As Montgomery is incrementally developed in the courts, it is important that the
relevance of shared decision-making and patient autonomy are recognised and pro-
moted. This would help facilitate the articulation of Bolam and Montgomery’s respective
application, whilst promoting workable patient-centred standards in a manner that is
alive to the needs of some patients for support and to the relevance of HCP expertise in
determining the suitability of treatment and in providing advice.
Another part of the Montgomery ‘enigma’ is the potential gap between legal principle
and application. The GMC conducted research in 2017 reporting that awareness of the
Montgomery decision is low and doctors fear that a lack of time in consultations can
prevent a full understanding of the particular patient’s needs. Doctors can find assess-
ments of capacity difficult and are not all equipped to translate complex information in a
digestible form.123 If cultural change can be brought about, resources are needed for
implementation. But limitations on resources impact upon the time HCPs have to engage
in dialogue and the alternatives that can be offered.124 Laing has highlighted the stresses
on the partnership model that the Montgomery judgment advocates,125 that result from
the financial pressures on the NHS and the considerable strains under which the work
force operate.126
There is also evidence of variation in Montgomery’s perceived relevance between
specialties. The production of specific consent guidance post-Montgomery from the
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists,127 Association of Anaesthesiolo-
gists,128 Royal College of Surgeons,129 Royal College of Nursing130 and British Ortho-
paedics Association131 reflect the fact that these are the specialisms most likely to face
clinical negligence litigation. Outside these areas, there is less focus on the legal changes
from the Royal Colleges, at least in terms of published guidance responding to Mon-
tgomery. We can surmise that there may therefore be less understanding of the new
123. Community Research, Doctors’ Attitudes to Informed Consent and Shared Decision
Making: Full Research Report for the GMC (June 2017). Available at: https://www.gmc-
uk.org/-/media/documents/Doctors_attitudes_to_consent_and_shared_decision_making_
FINAL_research_report.pdf_72137875.pdf (accessed 30 March 2020).
124. GMC ‘Under-Pressure Doctors Need Time for Patients, Says GMC’ (24 October 2018).
Available at: https://www.gmc-uk.org/news/news-archive/consent-consultation (accessed
30 March 2020).
125. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [81] (Lords Kerr and Reed).
126. Laing, ‘Delivering Informed Consent Post-Montgomery’.
127. RCOG, Obtaining Valid Consent: Clinical Governance Advice No. 6 (2015). Available at:
https://www.rcog.org.uk/globalassets/documents/guidelines/clinical-governance-advice/
cga6.pdf (accessed 30 March 2020).
128. AAGBI, Consent for Anaesthesia (2017). Available at: https://www.aagbi.org/sites/default/
files/AAGBI_Consent_for_anaesthesia_2017_0.pdf (accessed 30 March 2020).
129. RCS, Consent: Supported Decision-Making (2016). Available at: https://www.rcseng.ac.
uk/library-and-publications/rcs-publications/docs/consent-good-practice-guide/ (accessed
30 March 2020).
130. RCN, Principles of Consent: Guidance for Nursing Staff (2015).
131. British Orthopaedic Association, Guidance on Consent (2016). Available at: https://www.
boa.ac.uk/publications/guidance-documents/#toggle-id-3 (accessed 30 March 2020).
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responsibilities among HCPs in those specialties that are less likely to face clinical
negligence suits.
Some patient choices bypass HCPs altogether, which self-evidently limits opportu-
nities for partnership and support relied upon in Montgomery. In essence, patients may
rely on advice in a situation where there is no individual HCP to challenge in a lawsuit, in
which case there may be less pressure on those responsible for the advice to make it
compatible with Montgomery principles. For example, the information revolution can
leave vulnerable people exposed to harmful information as seen in social media suicide
posts132 and depictions of Anorexia Nervosa as a positive lifestyle choice.133 Access to
complex healthcare information that bypasses the HCP gatekeeper can pose risks of
misunderstanding, as in the case of some direct-to-consumer predictive and pre-
dispositional genetic testing134 and online pharmacies.135 In 2010, the Nuffield Council
on Bioethics concluded that the government needs to do more to ensure information is
accurate and consent is informed.136 Patients can access more information than ever
before and this can steer people who do not need medical intervention away from
healthcare services, help patients to frame their questions for HCPs and reassure them
post-consultation.137 On the other hand, many evidence-based articles are hidden behind
a paywall and misinformation can put strain on services and exacerbate public health
concerns.138 In such cases, Montgomery is not directly applicable, but the principle of
patient-centred care remains relevant. Adherence to that principle may necessitate pres-
sure on the government to ensure that public information is fit for purpose.
132. A. Crawford, ‘Instagram ‘Helped Kill My Daughter’, BBC News 22 January 2019.
Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-46966009/instagram-helped-kill-my-
daughter (accessed 30 March 2020).
133. M. Bromberg and T. Fitzgerald, ‘Let’s Starve Down to the Bone: Pro-Anorexia Websites
and the Law’, Journal of Law and Medicine 25 (2017), p. 124.
134. A. Muhdawi, ‘Why Did I Risk My Privacy with Home DNA Testing? I Blame my
Neanderthal Heritage’, The Guardian 28 March 2018. Available at: https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/28/what-did-i-learn-from-my-diy-dna-test-
how-foolish-i-was-to-sign-my-life-away (accessed 30 March 2020).
135. T.K. Mackey and G. Nayyar, ‘Digital Danger: A Review of The Global Public Health,
Patient Safety and Cybersecurity Threats Posed by Illicit Online Pharmacies’, British
Medical Bulletin 118(1) (2006), p. 110; General Pharmaceutical Council, Guidance for
Registered Pharmacies Providing Pharmacy Services at a Distance, Including on the
Internet (2019). Available at: https://www.pharmacyregulation.org/sites/default/files/
document/guidance_for_registered_pharmacies_providing_pharmacy_services_at_a_
distance_including_on_the_internet_april_2019.pdf (accessed 30 March 2020).
136. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Medical Profiling and Online Medicine: The Ethics of
‘Personalised Healthcare’ in a Consumer Age (London, 2010).
137. M. McMullan, ‘Patients Using the Internet to Obtain Health Information: How This Affects
the Patient-Health Professional Relationship’, Patient Education and Counseling 63 (2006),
p. 24.
138. For example, A. Kata, ‘A Postmodern Pandora’s Box: Anti-Vaccination Misinformation on
The Internet’, Vaccine 28(7) (2010), p. 1709.
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Variations in treatment type might also affect Montgomery’s application. For exam-
ple, medical advancements allow increasingly individualised care which can decrease
choice and impact on the partnership model. The drive towards personalised (or preci-
sion) medicine tailors advice, prevention, diagnosis, treatment and aftercare to the indi-
vidual, usually based on genetic data, rather than the disease. For example, cancer
treatment can be matched to the patient’s genetic make-up and tumour growth. Mon-
tgomery emphasises the importance of patient values,139 but it is not clear how values
will fit into personalised medicine. Clinically indicated options might be reduced to one
and the advisory function of the HCP diminished, with the result that less attention is
paid to the patient’s particular values and preferences. Adherence to a patient-centred
approach might lead to greater focus on tailoring the choices to the person as well as their
genetic profile if individual values and personalised medicine are brought into tension.
Some aspects of law are regulated by statutes enacted when Bolam was more domi-
nant. Take, for example, the Abortion Act 1967.140 Evidence of an HCP-centred
approach141 flows from the medicalisation of abortion. Though during the coronavirus
crisis temporary approval was given to early medical abortion at home,142 the 1967 Act
takes a medicalised approach whereby two registered medical practitioners must form an
opinion in good faith that the abortion fits within one of a series of defences to what
would otherwise constitute a crime under sections 58–59 of the Offences Against the
Person Act 1861. The Act pays little heed to the process of consent and the woman’s
understanding of relevant information. Fifty years after the Act came into force, Lee
et al. describe a shift in professional attitude that exposes tensions in the Act flowing
from better support for women’s choices and the rejection by HCPs of medical hierar-
chies.143 The articulation of principles of information disclosure in Montgomery may
lead to new challenges of Bolam-era legislation if evidence suggests that the legislation
fails to support patient-centred practice.
Brazier and Montgomery persuasively argue that Bolam is gradually being ‘left
behind’. They point to the Supreme Court decision of Darnley as an example.144 There,
it was held that inaccurate information that leads to harm is actionable in an accident and
emergency department, just as it would be in other settings. They see this as evidence of
‘a more orthodox approach . . . to determining the standard of care in hospitals’.145 We
139. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [45], [80], [115].
140. As amended by Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s 37.
141. S. McGuinness and M. Thomson, ‘Medicine and Abortion Law: Complicating the
Reforming Profession’, Medical Law Reports 23(2) (2015), p. 177.
142. DHSC, Temporary Approval of Home Use for Both Stages of Early Medical Abortion (30
March 2020). Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/temporary-
approval-of-home-use-for-both-stages-of-early-medical-abortion–2 (accessed 30 March
2020).
143. E. Lee, S. Sheldon and J. Macvarish, ‘The 1967 Abortion Act Fifty Years On: Abortion,
Medical Authority and the Law Revisited’, Social Science & Medicine 212 (2018), p. 26.
144. Darnley v. Croydon Health Services NHS Trust [2018] UKSC 50. Note that Bolam was not
central to the decision because receptionists are not healthcare professionals.
145. Brazier and Montgomery, ‘Whence and Whither ‘Modern Medical Law’, p. 24.
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agree that the adoption of patient-centred principles in Montgomery and related cases is
having a positive effect, but caution that Montgomery’s potential should not be exag-
gerated. Montgomery concerned a physical intervention on a living patient. Differentials
among health providers (from hospitals to care homes, surgeries to hospices, private and
NHS) result in the prioritisation of different missions and values. The principles of
partnership and patient autonomy endorsed in Montgomery have relevance in research,
observational studies, use of personal data, and in issues after death such as organ or
tissue transplantation. In these settings, however, competing values may apply. The
plurality of values outside mainstream medicine makes for uneven application of
patient-centred practice and partnership. Data-sharing encompasses public interest and
commercial value of data; public health emphasises the public interest, as has become so
apparent in the coronavirus pandemic ongoing at the time of writing.146
It is also worth noting that Montgomery focuses on a restricted patient group – namely
‘adult patients of sound mind’.147 Patients who lack capacity, who are subject to com-
pulsory treatment under the Mental Health Act 1983, or who are under the age of 16 and
lack the competence to consent have dubious claims for negligent non-disclosure of risk,
but the principles of support, participation, partnership and patient-centred medicine are
relevant here too and have potential to influence legal development outside of negli-
gence. This matter is explored in a separate paper.148
This section has not sought to offer a comprehensive assessment of Montgomery’s
relevance across healthcare, but rather to point out the potential for variability in
commitment to patient values when giving medical advice, given constraints on
HCP time, resources and awareness and the differences in HCP-type, patient group
and healthcare setting. Montgomery is not a panacea in the move away from HCP-
centred practice in information provision that followed the Bolam decision. There
are cases where patient autonomy and partnership must give way to competing
values.
The Montgomery supremacy?
We have focussed on the Bolam legacy in two contexts: the first is within the law
of clinical negligence and the second looks beyond negligence to the potential to
mitigate an entrenched Bolamised approach and deliver a patient-centred approach
to medical advice. We are some way off a ‘Montgomery supremacy’ in both
regards.
Taking the latter first, we have identified aspects of advice, areas of medicine and
patient demographics where Montgomery’s bearing is limited. Two 2020 independent
inquiries have outlined failures with regard to informed consent and the need to
146. On which see S. Devaney, J. Miola, E. Cave, et al., ‘Healthcare Professional Standards in
Pandemic Conditions: The Duty to Obtain Consent to Treatment’, Journal of Bioethical
Inquiry, forthcoming.
147. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [50], [68], [87].
148. .E. Cave, C. Purshouse, ’Think of the Children: Liability for Non-Disclosure of Information
Post Montgomery’, Medical Law Review 28(2) (2020), p. 270,
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strengthen commitment to a patient-centred approach embracing partnership and patient
autonomy. The Paterson Inquiry chaired by Rev’d Graham James made recommenda-
tions to improve the consent process, including writing to patients to outline their
condition and treatment and to make sure the patient’s GP is also informed, and giving
patients a short period of time to process information about diagnosis and treatment
options before surgical procedures. Additional points were made in Baroness Julia
Cumberlege’s medicines and medical devices safety review.149 Describing Montgomery
as ‘landmark’ and ‘a watershed’150 the 2020 report stated:
No longer can informed patient consent be anything other than a true equality of partnership
in the decision making process between patients and their treating physicians. Their care
and treatment should not be a series of events that happened to them. Rather, every patient
should be able to stand back, look at their patient journey and say ‘I recognise my hand-
writing all over those choices.151
The report suggests better use of patient decision aids and access to patient testimo-
nials as part of the informed consent process. It further recommends recording conversa-
tions where appropriate, so that patients have opportunity to reflect. Both reports advise
the GMC to incorporate recommendations reflecting the spirit of Montgomery into
guidance and to monitor compliance as part of ‘Good Medical Practice’.152 If this is
achieved then Montgomery’s relevance will be expanded further beyond the law of
negligence to aspects of practice where patients have a legitimate expectation of part-
nership and choice. In doing so it will be important to acknowledge that choices are often
limited and that partnership does not equate to a patient right to demand interventions
that are not clinically justified.
With regard to claims for negligent non-disclosure of information, though Mon-
tgomery signalled the dissection of the duty of care and the end of Bolam’s reign with
regard to the test for materiality of risk, we have identified ways in which Bolam
remains pertinent. The disapplication of Bolam in Montgomery is not complete, but
this does not mean that the Bolam legacy cannot be confined where it threatens
unwarranted paternalism in place of partnership and sensitivity to patient values. The
significance of advice does not end with risks inherent in treatment or even with
treatment. Aspects of diagnosis/treatment and information disclosure will converge
when, for example, advice is needed for diagnostic testing; or where treatment neces-
sitates advice regarding prognosis.153 There is potential for the incremental develop-
ment of Montgomery to enhance respect for patient autonomy and emphasise shared
149. Baroness Cumberlege (Chair), First Do No Harm: The report of the Independent Medicines
and Medical Devices Safety Review. 2020. Available at: https://www.immdsreview.org.uk/
downloads/IMMDSReview_Web.pdf (accessed 20 July 2020).
150. Op. cit., paras 2.13 and 2.19, respectively.
151. Op. cit., para. 2.17.
152. Op. cit., para. 2.24; DHSC, Paterson Inquiry Report, pp. 218–219.
153. Hii Chii Kok v. (1) Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien; (2) National Cancer Centre [2017] SGCA
38, [91].
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decision-making (or ‘partnership’ as it is referred to in Montgomery) beyond the
confines of non-disclosure of risk, benefits and reasonable alternatives, to encompass
wider aspects of the HCP’s advisory role.
One method at the courts’ disposal is to apply Montgomery when patient values are
pertinent on the facts. As we have seen, where disclosure of risk relating to one treatment
option can be linked to the reasonableness of disclosure as to an alternative option, the
Montgomery test will be relevant: the failure to offer an alternative becomes a matter of
disclosure rather than treatment selection, because of the relationship to the risk inherent
in the accepted treatment. The same argument might apply to other aspects of the
decision-making process. For example, a differently framed Montgomery case could
potentially have focussed on the issue of differential diagnosis. Montgomery involved
a misdiagnosis of fetal weight.154 While the question of whether there had been a
misdiagnosis would fall under Bolam, the same is not necessarily true of failure to
communicate doubt as to diagnosis (of fetal weight) if that can be linked to the risk
inherent in the proposed course of action.
Another method is to extend Montgomery’s application beyond treatment to encom-
pass other aspects of medical advice. The courts have shown some willingness in this
regard. Shortly after the Montgomery decision, in Spencer v. Hillingdon Hospital NHS
Trust, the court found that a patient was not given adequate information as to the
symptoms of post-operative deep vein thrombosis.155 Subsequently, in Gallardo v.
Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust,156 Mr Gallardo was treated in 2001 for a
suspected stomach ulcer that proved to be a malignant stromal tumour, but the malig-
nancy and risk of recurrence was not disclosed to him until 2010. Judge Peter Hughes QC
held that: ‘By analogy [with Montgomery], it is the patient’s right to be informed of the
outcome of the treatment, the prognosis, and what the follow-up care and treatment
options are’.157 The principles set out in Montgomery that supported the right to be
informed, also supported the patient’s ‘right to be told’.158 In Webster v. Burton Hospi-
tals NHS FT,159 it was agreed that a failure to undertake additional ultrasound scans
during pregnancy was negligent. The High Court (sitting pre-Montgomery) applied
Bolam and found that a reasonable and responsible body of obstetric opinion supported
the Consultant’s actions. The Court of Appeal (post-Montgomery) held that this was no
longer the correct approach.160 Had there been a proper dialogue, Mrs Webster would
have opted to have labour induced. Fox argues that application of Montgomery in this
case demonstrates the potential for application beyond non-disclosure of information to
154. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [14].
155. Spencer v. Hillingdon Hospital NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 1058. See commentary above re
application of Bolam in this case and subsequent criticism.
156. Gallardo v. Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust [2017] EWHC 3147 (QB).
157. Op. cit., [70].
158. Op. cit., [75].
159. Webster v. Burton Hospitals NHS FT [2017] EWCA Civ 62, [41] (Simon LJ).
160. Op. cit., [34] (Simon LJ).
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advice more generally,161 at least where the patient has not been properly informed and
harm has resulted.162
A further possibility is to accept the application of Bolam to certain wider issues of
informed consent where the matter in question turns on medical expertise and expert
evidence is required to establish its reasonableness but adapt its application to limit the
HCP-centred, paternalistic focus. This could potentially be achieved through the appli-
cation of the Bolitho gloss. It will be recalled that the House of Lords in Bolitho corrected
a misinterpretation of Bolam, by requiring that judges are satisfied that medical opinion
rests on logical grounds. Two recent cases provide evidence that the courts are willing to
question established practice on the basis that it is illogical because it is not compliant
with Montgomery. Both are claims for damages for the upbringing of a child. In ARB v.
IVF Hammersmith,163 ARB claimed in breach of contract against an IVF clinic that
thawed and implanted a frozen embryo into ARB’s former partner without his consent,
resulting in the birth of his genetic child. Jay J found at first instance that the consent
form had been forged by ARB’s ex-partner. The claim failed on policy grounds, but the
Court of Appeal held that the clinic was in breach of its strict obligations given the lack
of genuine consent. Montgomery was relevant to the finding that the IVF clinic’s pro-
cesses for obtaining consent were illogical, unreasonable and irresponsible.164 This was
so notwithstanding that the process was established and common to other clinics. Sub-
sequently, in Mordel v. Royal Berkshire NHS Foundation Trust,165 Jay J said of the ARB
decision:
This authority is valuable to the extent that it vouches that a system which does not entail the
taking of reasonable steps to ensure that relevant consent is informed may be regarded –
subject always to a host of other considerations – as irresponsible, unreasonable and unre-
spectable even if there may exist expert evidence to support it.166
161. S. Fox QC, Bolam is Dead, Long Live Bolam! (2 October 2018). Exchange Chambers blog
post. Available at: https://www.exchangechambers.co.uk/bolam-is-dead-long-live-bolam-
simon-fox-qc/ (accessed 30 March 2020). But note wrongful life case Khan v. MNX [2018]
EWCA Civ 2609 which distinguished advice (where the advisor is responsible for guiding
the whole decision-making process) and information (where the advisor contributes
information relevant to one aspect of a decision made by the individual). The HCP was
liable for damage resulting from negligent mis-information but not for the overall decision
of the woman to become pregnant.
162. In Price v. Cwm Taf University Health Board [2019] EWHC 938 (QB), though an operation
was not clinically indicated and was contrary to NICE guidelines, the consent process was
not flawed because the operation had potential benefit of which Mr Price was informed. On
the requirement of harm: ‘Although harm is the focus of much of the reasoning in [Chester
and Montgomery], I note the reference to dialogue and to anticipated benefits in paragraph
90 of the speech of Lord Kerr and Lord Reed in Montgomery.’ [26] (Birss J).
163. [2018] EWCA Civ 2803.
164. Op. cit., [59] (Davies LJ).
165. Mordel v. Royal Berkshire NHS Foundation Trust [2019] EWHC 2591 (QB).
166. Op. cit., [19].
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In Mordel, the logicality of processes designed to establish the choices of pregnant
women with regard to screening for Down’s syndrome was called into question. Though
Montgomery was not ‘central to the issue’ it was nonetheless found to be relevant:
to underscore that the issue of consent and the need for it to be truly informed is a question
of right rather than discretion; and that the patient must be provided with sufficient infor-
mation to make an informed decision.167
If Bolam is to sit more comfortably alongside Montgomery, then the Bolitho gloss
might be utilised to ensure that reasonableness is viewed through the prism of Mon-
tgomery principles. In Birch, Cranston J opined that even if the failure to warn of the
existence of a less risky alternative did not deny the patient the opportunity to give
informed consent, ‘the failure to discuss with Mrs Birch these matters could not be
described in law as reasonable, responsible or logical’.168
Post-Bolam, judges were initially reluctant to evaluate an HCP’s reasonableness and
responsibility, deferring instead to medical expert opinion. Post-Bolitho, Teff questions
the circumstances in which expert evidence might be disregarded.169 Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s reference to ‘logic’ might focus narrowly on internal consistency and cred-
ibility of the expert. Conversely, ‘use of the term logic may be seen as a residue of
deference, not to be understood in any unduly constraining sense in future cases’,170 in
which case there is scope for judges to question the substantive content of the decision.
In 2018, the Court of Appeal took a restrictive stance, setting a high standard for a
claimant to satisfy: except in stark cases, expert evidence will usually be required to
demonstrate illogicality.171 Nonetheless, wider application of Montgomery principles of
partnership and patient-centred practice might require HCPs to negotiate the ‘schools of
thought in medical science’172 with the patient in mind. If so, then there are grounds upon
which to argue that HCP-centred practice is illogical and untenable in those rare cases
that alternative ‘schools of thought in medical science’ apply, but the identification of
treatment options or constructive knowledge of risk flows from ‘divergent attitudes
among doctors as to the degree of respect owed to their patients’.173
In this section, it has been argued that commitment to the Montgomery principles of
autonomy and partnership would lead to gradual extension of the patient-centred Mon-
tgomery approach by analogy. Even where Bolam applies, the relevance of Montgomery
to the Bolitho gloss has been established in ARB and is likely to lead to other instances
where processes that do not comply with Montgomery principles are challenged.
167. Op. cit., [18].
168. Birch v. University College London Hospital NHS FT [2008] EWHC 2237 (QB).
169. H. Teff, ‘The Standard of Care in Medical Negligence – Moving on from Bolam?’, Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 18(3) (1998), p. 473.
170. Op. cit., 481.
171. Williams v. Cwm Taf Local Health Board [2018] EWCA Civ 1745, [14] (Underhill LJ).
172. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [84].
173. Op. cit.
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Conclusion
The emphasis on HCP-centred medicine in Bolam has gradually been undermined by
social and legal developments,174 but we have set out two ways in which the Bolam
legacy remains relevant when judging the adequacy of medical advice. First, Mon-
tgomery only goes so far in challenging the pervasive nature of Bolam. Inherent
limitations flow from reference in Montgomery to consumerism and there are prac-
tical impediments to Montgomery’s application. As the Cumberlege report175
recently exemplified, paternalistic behaviour is still commonplace. In extending the
relevance of a patient-centred approach beyond the law of non-disclosure of material
risk, we have argued that it is important to manage consumeristic patient expecta-
tions. HCPs have a legitimate role in limiting recourse to treatment options that are
not clinically indicated.
Second, Bolam retains doctrinal relevance. Lord Diplock warned in Sidaway that the
dissection of negligence would be neither meaningful nor practical. We have argued
that the dissection was a meaningful and relevant response to the ethical requirement to
challenge medical dominance over the law, but we have acknowledged and described
difficulties as to practicability and coherence. The division of negligence is in part a
distinction between treatment and diagnosis on the one hand and information and
advice on the other. It is in part a distinction according to the relevance of medical
expertise and patient values. As we have seen, the different explanations do not always
align. The focus on medical expertise is not a principle of law, but a practical distinc-
tion based on the fact that diagnosis and treatment are more likely to raise technical
questions.176 Where medicine is less technical in nature, or where patient values are
pertinent to the decision, judges may show increasing willingness to question the
clinical view whether through direct application of Montgomery or the development
of the Bolitho gloss.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Sarah Devaney, Craig Purshouse and Caroline Saunders for discussion
of themes, and particularly Rob Heywood and José Miola for comments on a previous draft. The
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